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Halo from the Other Side: An Empirical Study of 
District Court Findings of Willful Infringement 
and Enhanced Damages Post-Halo 
Veena Tripathi 
  INTRODUCTION   
Patent damages law is one of the most complex areas in pa-
tent law and is constantly evolving.1 Given the lack of legislative 
oversight, courts have taken it upon themselves to create stand-
ards to govern the award of patent damages.2 Judges are seated 
at the heart of this issue. With demanding legal schedules and a 
seemingly unending docket, it may be difficult for judges to sit 
down and create empirical calculations to evaluate the effective-
ness of these legal standards. Thus, scholars must evaluate the 
effectiveness of judicially-created standards for awarding patent 
damages to ensure that the system is functioning as it should 
and rewarding behavior that it intends to see replicated. 
Patent law is built on the principle that providing inventors 
with exclusive rights to their inventions will incentivize the cre-
ation and dissemination of valuable innovations.3 These exclu-
 
  J.D. Candidate 2019 University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you 
to Professor Thomas Cotter for the advice and comments through the many 
drafts of this publication. Thank you to David Hahn, Joshua Greenberg, 
Frances Fink, Peter Estall, Emily Kurtz and Aman Khalid for their patience, 
comments, and guidance. Thank you to Volume 103 staff and editors for their 
excellent editorial work. Finally, thank you to Leena and Vikram Tripathi with-
out whom (quite literally) none of this would be possible. All mistakes are my 
own. Copyright © 2019 by Veena Tripathi. 
 1. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1427, 1446 (2018) (detailing the complex developments in awarding dam-
ages and enhanced damages in patent law). 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. The instrumental purpose of patent law is stated explicitly in the U.S. 
Constitution, which empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8; cf. ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
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sive rights include the ability to make, use, and sell certain in-
novations and, more importantly, to prevent others from doing 
the same.4 This belief is central to the American patent system 
and is enshrined in the Constitution.5 One possible way of pro-
tecting those rights is awarding damages to a party whose prop-
erty rights were infringed.6 Depending on how badly a patentee’s 
rights were infringed, the patentee may be able to sue for “willful 
infringement.” Willful infringement covers behavior that is par-
ticularly egregious and detrimental to the patent system, includ-
ing deliberate copying and attempts to conceal infringement.7 
Courts have used words such as “pirate behavior”8 to describe 
willful infringement,9 but, outside of that, the phrase has not 
been clarified.10 
 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 42 (2005) (“[T]he 
standard justification for patents and copyrights is that they provide a neces-
sary incentive to create, disseminate, and commercialize inventions and works 
of authorship.”). 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, 
whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented in-
vention, within the United States or imports into the United States any pa-
tented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
 5. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It was signed in convention on Sep-
tember 17, 1787. Article I: Legislative Branch, NAT’L CONST. CTR., http://www 
.constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-i (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
 6. Id.; see also BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 3, at 42 (“[T]he standard jus-
tification for patents and copyrights is that they provide a necessary incentive 
to create, disseminate, and commercialize inventions and works of author-
ship.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana 
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (confirming that neither the Su-
preme Court nor the Federal Circuit has provided an express definition for will-
ful infringement, which could be applied to all patent infringement cases). 
 8. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016) (“The 
sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously described in 
our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrong-
ful, flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate.”). 
 9. Knorr-Bremse Systeme, 383 F.3d at 1342 (“[T]he word ‘willful’ is widely 
used in the law, and, although it has not by any means been given a perfectly 
consistent interpretation, it is generally understood to refer to conduct that is 
not merely negligent, . . . [and] the Court [has cited] conventional definitions 
such as ‘voluntary,’ ‘deliberate,’ and ‘intentional.’” (quoting McLaughlin v. Rich-
land Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133 (1988))). 
 10. See Stephanie Pall, Note, Willful Patent Infringement: Theoretically 
Sound? A Proposal to Restore Willful Infringement to Its Proper Place Within 
Patent Law, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 689 (2006) (advocating for the adoption of 
a “more consistent definition of willful patent infringement”). 
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In 2016, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify this ambi-
guity by creating a new standard to determine willful infringe-
ment in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. (Halo).11 
The Supreme Court in Halo struck down the previous standard, 
referring to it as “unduly rigid,” and created a new, lower eviden-
tiary burden and recklessness standard targeted at punishing 
instances of willful infringement.12 The standard used to deter-
mine whether behavior is “willful” is impactful for several rea-
sons.13 Most importantly, willful infringement is a precursor to 
awarding enhanced damages, damages awarded by the judge to 
punish particularly malicious behavior on the part of the in-
fringer.14 Thus, the changed standard may have an immense 
consequence for patentees and infringers alike: more frequent 
and larger damages sums.15 As of yet, no academic studies em-
pirically demonstrate the actual impact of Halo. 
This Note seeks to fill that gap as the first comprehensive 
empirical study of willful patent infringement and enhanced 
damages after Halo. Part I discusses the evolution of patent 
damages and the emergence of the Halo standard. Part II ex-
plains this Note’s methodology and results. Part III addresses 
the implications of these results and identifies trends that 
emerge from the results. This Note ultimately finds that the 
changed evidentiary standard and the elimination of the objec-
tive recklessness standard has significantly changed district 
courts’ findings of willful infringement and enhanced damages. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT DAMAGES AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF HALO   
Before addressing the impact of Halo, it is useful to put Halo 
in context. To do so, a preliminary understanding of the damages 
available in patent cases may help contextualize the rationale of 
why certain damages are awarded. Additionally, it will be help-
ful to trace the evolution of the willful infringement doctrine to 
better understand the importance of Halo. Thus, this Section 
will first provide a brief overview of patent damages. Second, 
 
 11. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1923. 
 12. Id. at 1932–34. 
 13. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. Enhanced damages are damages awarded by the judge if behavior is 
seen as egregious or needing to be deterred. There will be a greater discussion 
of this concept in Part I. 
 15. See infra Part I.B., I.C. 
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this Section will trace the historical emergence of the willful in-
fringement standard including a discussion of key standards and 
their application. Finally, this section will conclude with a de-
scription of Halo and the anticipated impact of the case. 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW 
Because this Note studies the effect that Halo has made on 
enhanced damages, a preliminary understanding of patent dam-
ages is necessary. This Section provides an overview of the types 
of damages available to a patentee who has succeeded on a claim 
of infringement by first introducing infringement and then 
briefly outlining the rationale behind compensatory and en-
hanced damages. 
Patents, established by Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Con-
stitution, give Congress the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”16 This provision gives inventors the right to ex-
clude others from their inventions and inventive concepts. If a 
party makes, uses, sells, or offers to sell a patented invention, 
the patent holder can sue for infringement,17 a strict liability of-
fense.18 If a patent is found to have been infringed, the Patent 
Act, Title 35 §§ 1–376 of the U.S. Code,19 provides two remedies: 
monetary damages20 and injunctions.21 The monetary damages 
can be further broken down into compensatory damages and en-
hanced damages, both discussed under 35 U.S.C. § 284.22 
Modeled after tort law, compensatory damages are aimed at 
“making the plaintiff whole again.”23 Compensatory damages 
 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 18. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999); In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (en banc), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. 
Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 19. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376. 
 20. Id. § 284. 
 21. Id. § 283. 
 22. Attorneys’ fees are also available under 35 U.S.C. § 285. However, at-
torney’s fees are outside the scope of this Note.  
 23. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(“The role of a finding of ‘willfulness’ in the law of infringement is partly as a 
deterrent—an economic deterrent to the tort of infringement—and partly as a 
basis for making economically whole one who has been wronged . . . .”); see also 
Karshtedt, supra note 1, at 1447 (discussing the “tort underpinnings” of dam-
ages under the Patent Act). 
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can be broken up into three different categories: lost profits, es-
tablished royalty, and reasonable royalty. Lost profits, for exam-
ple, consult a series of factors which determine what profits 
would have been made by the patentee “but for” the infringe-
ment.24 Awarding an established royalty or reasonable royalty 
adopts or emulates the terms by which the patentee would have 
licensed the defendant’s use of the invention.25 Importantly, each 
method for awarding compensatory damages requires judges to 
fully explain their rationale for the amount awarded.26 
In contrast to compensatory damages which are aimed at 
making the plaintiff whole again, enhanced damages are de-
signed to punish or deter certain behavior.27 Awarding enhanced 
damages has evolved into a two-step inquiry.28 First the fact-
finder must determine whether the infringement was willful.29 
Only if there is willful infringement will a judge move forward 
and evaluate whether enhanced damages are warranted.30 Im-
portantly, enhanced damages are discretionary, meaning that 
 
 24. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc); BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993). 
 25. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (explaining the willing licensor-willing licensee negotiation that can be 
used to calculate a reasonable royalty), modified and aff ’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971); see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 
488 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing the basis for an established roy-
alty by stating “[w]hen the patentee has consistently licensed others to engage 
in conduct comparable to the defendant’s at a uniform royalty, that royalty is 
taken as established and indicates the terms upon which the patentee would 
have licensed the defendant’s use of the invention”). 
 26. See Comcast Cable Commc’ns, L.L.C. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 218 F. 
Supp. 3d 375, 382 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (explaining that judges may be required to 
establish “‘[t]he rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents compara-
ble to the patent in the suit,’ ‘[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should be 
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements; the 
manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements 
added by the infringer,’ and the result of a hypothetical negotiation to determine 
‘the amount that a licensor . . . and a licensee . . . would have agreed upon (at 
the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily 
trying to reach an agreement’” (quoting Ga.-Pac. Corp., 318 F. Supp. 3d at 1120) 
(alterations in original)). 
 27. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016) 
(“Awards of enhanced damages . . . are . . . designed as a ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ 
sanction for egregious infringement behavior.”); see also Karshtedt, supra note 
1, at 1449–51 (discussing the historical support for the theory that enhanced 
damages are meant to punish the infringer). 
 28. See infra Part I.C. 
 29. See infra Part I.C. 
 30. See infra Part I.C. 
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judges are not required to award enhanced damages even if the 
infringement is willful.31 Thus, it is important to then turn to a 
more detailed discussion of willful infringement to better assess 
the impact of this standard on awarding enhanced damages. 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT 
One of the major issues surrounding willful infringement is 
the ambiguous standard used to determine exactly what willful 
infringement is. Congress gave courts the ability to award en-
hanced damages but did not give courts guidance on when they 
should be awarded.32 Out of this dilemma, courts created the 
willful infringement standard.33 The three most recent iterations 
of the willful infringement standard are the affirmative duty of 
care standard,34 the objective recklessness standard,35 and the 
Halo standard.36 All three standards articulate different meth-
ods for determining whether willful infringement occurred.37 
This Note does not attempt to define what willful infringement 
should be.38 However, understanding the evolution of the willful 
 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed.” (emphasis added)); Read Corp. v. 
Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–28 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing several factors includ-
ing deliberate copying, motivation for harm, and attempting to conceal miscon-
duct). 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (“When the damages are not found by a jury, the court 
shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to 
three times the amount found or assessed.” (emphasis added)); see also Karsht-
edt, supra note 1 (discussing patent damages). 
 33. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 
1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that bad faith infringement, a type of willful infringe-
ment, is required for enhanced damages). This standard aligns with Supreme 
Court precedent on non-patent related issues and holds that “wanton or mali-
cious” injury could result in enhanced damages. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible 
Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964) (holding that enhanced damages 
were available for willful or bad faith infringement); see also Dowling v. United 
States, 473 U.S. 207, 227 n.19 (1985) (holding that enhanced damages are avail-
able for “willful infringement”); Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 489 (1853) 
(holding that “wanton or malicious” injury could result in exemplary damages). 
 34. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (coining the term “affirmative duty to exercise due care”). 
 35. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc) (coining the term “objective recklessness”), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. 
v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 36. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932. 
 37. See infra Parts I.B.2, I.B.3. 
 38. The most recent iteration of “willful infringement” came from Halo. The 
court stated that willful behavior is “[t]he sort of conduct warranting enhanced 
damages [which] has been variously described in our cases as willful, wanton, 
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infringement standard is necessary to assess whether Halo has 
made a difference. 
There have been several iterations of what willful infringe-
ment actually means. However, a few key principles of willful 
infringement are constant. First, a party’s behavior must be suf-
ficiently “bad” to warrant a finding of willful infringement. Just 
because a party has infringed, and perhaps did so in a way that 
is dishonest or unfair, does not mean that the party has willfully 
infringed. For example, a plaintiff is unlikely to successfully 
plead willful infringement even if she can show the alleged in-
fringer definitively knew about the existence of the patent, even 
perhaps knew that the patent could potentially infringe, and 
failed to investigate and remedy the potential infringement.39 
Second, willful infringement can be determined by either a 
judge or a jury.40 If the case is pre-trial or post-trial, the deter-
mination of willful infringement falls on the presiding judge.41 If 
the case is at trial, willful infringement is determined by the 
jury.42 The jury’s role in determining willful infringement is of-
ten debated among scholars and practitioners. However, the 
Federal Circuit has confirmed that there is a right to a jury trial 
in determining willful infringement.43 
 
malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, or—indeed—
characteristic of a pirate.” Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932. Though all of 
these adjectives have been used to describe willful behavior, a clear instruction 
of what constitutes willful infringement is broad enough to constitute its own 
publication. 
 39. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Regeneron Pharm., Inc., No. 
18CV2434(DLC), 2018 WL 5282887, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2018). 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“[W]hen the damages are not found by the jury, 
the court shall assess them.”). 
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (stating that judgement 
as a matter of law is appropriate if “the court finds that a reasonable jury would 
not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for [a] party” on an issue); 
see, e.g., Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that 
to prevail on a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury 
trial, the moving party “must show that the jury’s findings, presumed or ex-
press, are not supported by substantial evidence or, if they were, that the legal 
conclusions implied [by] the jury’s verdict cannot in law be supported by those 
findings” (alteration in original)). See generally Alan N. Herda, Note, Willful 
Patent Infringement and the Right to a Jury Trial, 9 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 
181, 209 (discussing statutory law and case law which lends support to the no-
tion that parties have a right to a jury trial in patent cases). 
 42. Herda, supra note 41. 
 43. Exmark Mfg. Co. v. Briggs & Stratton Power Prods. Grp., 879 F.3d 
1332, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Thus, under Halo, the district court no longer de-
termines as a threshold matter whether the accused infringer’s defenses are 
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1. Underwater Devices and the “Affirmative Duty of Care” 
Given the lack of statutory guidance, courts created the rule 
that an award of enhanced damages requires a showing of willful 
infringement.44 After the creation of the Federal Circuit,45 the 
standard for determining willful infringement was first consoli-
dated in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.46 
In this case, Underwater Devices obtained two patents for 
underwater pipes (“Robley patents”).47 In bidding for an under-
water-sewer project, Underwater Devices informed Morrison-
Knudsen about a series of patents, known as the Robley patents, 
and offered to license them to Morrison-Knudsen.48 Instead of 
accepting the bid, Morrison-Knudsen obtained a cursory opinion 
of counsel letter and permitted the construction of an infringing 
apparatus.49 The district court found that Morrison-Knudsen 
willfully infringed and Morrison-Knudsen swiftly appealed.50 In 
affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit held that when 
“a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent 
rights”, the infringer has an “affirmative duty” to ensure that it 
is not infringing.51 The court found that because the defendant 
did not seek advice from competent patent counsel, it failed to 
comply with its “affirmative duty of care,” thereby making its 
infringement willful.52 
 
objectively reasonable. Rather, the entire willfulness determination is to be de-
cided by the jury.”); WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 n.13 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (“[T]here is a right to a jury trial on the willfulness question.”). 
 44. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 45. In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act, which 
created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (also known as the CAFC 
or Federal Circuit). Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 86 
(2006). At the time the Federal Circuit was created, there was a lack of uni-
formity in U.S. patent law across the circuit courts. Id. To address this problem, 
Congress gave the Federal Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over nearly 
all patent litigation. Id. Now, if a patentee chooses to appeal a circuit court’s 
decision regarding infringement, validity, or a variety of other patent issues, 
the case will go to the Federal Circuit. From there, it can be appealed directly 
to the Supreme Court. Id. at 85–86. 
 46. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 47. Id. at 1383. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1386. 
 50. Id. at 1387. 
 51. Id. at 1389. 
 52. Id. at 1390. 
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There were several issues with interpreting this standard.53 
Defendants in these actions were now required to sink signifi-
cant costs into opinion of counsel letters to protect themselves 
from enhanced damages awards.54 Further, if an accused in-
fringer offered an opinion of counsel as evidence to rebuke a will-
fulness claim, the Federal Circuit required waiver of attorney-
client privilege for fairness in litigation.55 As such, parties were 
often forced to choose between protecting attorney-client privi-
lege or potentially losing on a willful infringement action.56 
Therefore, when In re Seagate went to the Federal Circuit, par-
ties were ready to re-evaluate the standard.57 
2. The Seagate Standard 
Though there were several iterations of what courts defined 
as willful infringement before In re Seagate Technology 
(Seagate), this 2007 Federal Circuit case created a multi-prong 
standard by which courts would evaluate whether willful in-
fringement had occurred.58 
Seagate arose from an infringement dispute regarding a pa-
tent on a system for removing selected and unwanted frequen-
cies in a data storage device.59 After learning of the alleged in-
fringement, Seagate, the defendant, obtained opinions of counsel 
 
 53. Kevin J. Kelly, Comment, Placing the Burden Back Where It Belongs: A 
Proposal to Eliminate the Affirmative Duty from Willful Infringement Analyses, 
4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 520–32 (2005). 
 54. Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness 
Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1092 (2003). 
 55. See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E’Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 
1092 (D. Nev. 2003) (“Fundamental fairness compels the conclusion that a liti-
gant may not use reliance on advice of counsel to support a claim or defense as 
a sword in litigation, and also deprive the opposing party the opportunity to test 
the legitimacy of that claim by asserting the attorney-client privilege or work-
product doctrine as a shield.”); see also In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 
1294, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 56. See Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“Proper resolution of the dilemma of an accused infringer who must choose be-
tween the lawful assertion of the attorney-client privilege and avoidance of a 
willfulness finding if infringement is found, is of great importance not only to 
the parties but to the fundamental values sought to be preserved by the attor-
ney-client privilege.”); see also Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge 
GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (discussing 
the complex role of attorney-client work product and opinions of counsel in will-
ful infringement decisions). 
 57. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc), abrogated by Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 58. Id. at 1370–72. 
 59. Id. at 1366–67. For the patents at issue, see U.S. Patent No. 4,916,635; 
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which explicitly said Seagate was not infringing, gathered work 
product related to the opinions, and continued to develop and 
market its products.60 At trial, Convolve, Inc., the patentee, re-
quested that all attorney work-product communication be 
turned over if Seagate intended to rely on it.61 The district court 
agreed and granted the motion to compel.62 Seagate petitioned 
the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus, who stayed the dis-
covery order to answer the questions of attorney-client privileged 
documents, work-product immunity, and reevaluation of the Un-
derwater Devices standard in light of these issues.63 Without ad-
dressing the first two concerns, the Federal Circuit overruled 
Underwater Devices.64 The Federal Circuit stated that the Un-
derwater Devices standard set a lower threshold for willful in-
fringement and it did not comport with Supreme Court prece-
dent in the civil context.65 Subsequently, it articulated a two-
part test for willfulness. 
The first prong of the Seagate test required the plaintiff to 
“show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted 
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted 
infringement of a valid patent.”66 The court explained that “[t]he 
state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this ob-
jective inquiry,” which was to be judged by “the record developed 
in the infringement proceeding.”67 Once the “threshold objective 
standard [was] satisfied,” a plaintiff was required to establish 
that the risk of infringement was “either known or so obvious 
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”68 In 
2012, Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, 
Inc. made the objectivity prong a question for the judge.69 Thus, 
juries were not even allowed to hear the evidentiary record until 
this prong was satisfied.  
 
U.S. Patent No. 5,638,267; and U.S. Patent No. 6,314,473. 
 60. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1366–67. 
 61. Id. at 1366. 
 62. Id. at 1367. 
 63. Id. at 1371. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1370–71 (explaining that the duty of care did not align with the 
“general understanding of willfulness in the civil context” and required reckless 
behavior, not mere negligence). 
 66. Id. at 1371. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 
1003, 1006–07 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
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The biggest issue with the Seagate standard was that it 
made willful infringement, specifically the first prong, very dif-
ficult for patentees to establish.70 Legitimate or credible defenses 
to infringement, even if ultimately not successful, would easily 
defeat a willful infringement finding.71 For example, in 
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the district court found that 
the defendant did not willfully infringe because it provided a vi-
able defense to infringement.72 Furthermore, the asserted de-
fense could be brought to the court long after the initial infringe-
ment began, thereby creating a perverse incentive to infringe 
now and worry later.73 Even empirically, it was found that a sub-
stantial defense to infringement was the “single best way to de-
feat a willfulness claim.”74 Out of a desire to remedy this bizarre 
outcome came the Supreme Court opinion in Halo Electronics, 
Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.75 
 
 70. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; see JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 511 
(3d ed. 2009) (“The Seagate standard significantly raised the bar on willfulness, 
making it more difficult for a patentee to establish than under the Federal Cir-
cuit’s previous standard.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Bard, 682 F.3d at 1005–06; Ateliers de la Haute-Garonne v. 
Broetje Automation-USA Inc., 85 F. Supp. 3d 768, 777 (D. Del. 2015) (finding 
the defendant did not willfully infringe because it relied on reasonable infringe-
ment defenses, such as claim construction and invalidity defenses); Impulse 
Tech. Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 11-586-RGA-CJB, 2015 WL 1737663, at *5 (D. 
Del. Apr. 9, 2015), report & recommendation adopted, No. 11-586-RGA, 2015 
WL 5568616 (D. Del. Sept. 22, 2015), aff ’d, 665 F. App’x 872 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 72. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 397, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“While Lansa was ultimately unsuccessful in defending against infringe-
ment or proving invalidity with regard to the ′075 Patent, its arguments in these 
areas were substantial, reasonable, and far from the sort of easily-dismissed 
claims that an objectively reckless infringer would be forced to rely upon.”). 
 73. See id. 
 74. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced 
Damages After In Re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 457 
(2012) (“The low odds ratio for this factor (0.124) suggest that an accused in-
fringer is several times less likely to be found willful if it can establish that it 
had a substantial or credible defense to the patentee’s infringement claim. Spe-
cifically, when a substantial defense existed, willfulness was found only 13% of 
the time (5 of 40 cases), compared to 57% of the time when no substantial de-
fense was found (55 of 96 cases).”). 
 75. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (finding that the Seagate standard was based 
solely on the “ability of the infringer to muster a reasonable (even though un-
successful) defense at the infringement trial.”). 
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3. The Halo Standard 
For nearly ten years, courts used the Seagate standard to 
evaluate willful infringement. However, the Supreme Court ab-
rogated the Seagate framework in 2016 with its decision in Halo 
Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc.76 
Beginning in 2002, Halo sent the defendant, Pulse, two let-
ters offering to license Halo’s patents.77 At this time, one of 
Pulse’s engineers concluded that Halo’s patents were invalid.78 
Subsequently, Pulse continued to sell its infringing products.79 
In 2007, Halo filed a lawsuit against Pulse in district court for 
infringement of three patents.80 At the district court level, the 
jury found that it was “highly probable” that Pulse willfully in-
fringed Halo’s patent.81 However, the district court declined to 
award enhanced damages under § 284 because Pulse’s provided 
defenses that were “not objectively baseless.”82 The Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed this finding.83 Halo then petitioned the Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari.84 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and consolidated the case with Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, 
Inc.,85 wherein the Federal Circuit also concluded that the peti-
tioner failed to satisfy the objective recklessness prong of the 
Seagate standard.86 
 
 76. Importantly, Halo involves the appeals from two Federal Circuit cases: 
Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and Halo Electron-
ics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In both cases, 
the Federal Circuit held there was no willful infringement based on the Seagate 
test. Stryker Corp., 782 F.3d at 662; Halo Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d at 1383. 
 77. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1935–36. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00331-PMP-PAL, 2013 
WL 2319145, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2012), aff ’d, 769 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014), 
vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). In a later post-trial motion, the 
district court concluded that the objective prong of the willful infringement in-
quiry was not satisfied because Pulse “reasonably relied on at least its obvious-
ness defense” and Pulse’s unsuccessful obviousness defense was not “objectively 
baseless.” Id. at *15. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 
2014), vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016). 
 84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (No. 14-
1513). 
 85. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1930–31. 
 86. Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649, 661–62 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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The Supreme Court vacated the judgement and subse-
quently remanded the case.87 The opinion had three key hold-
ings. First, the Supreme Court eliminated Seagate’s objective 
recklessness prong and focused on a subjective basis for enhanc-
ing damages given an infringer’s egregious conduct in the par-
ticular circumstances of the case.88 The Court determined that 
the two-pronged Seagate approach was “unduly rigid” and un-
necessarily obstructed the discretion of the district court.89 Fur-
ther, the Court noted that the Seagate standard insulated some 
of the worst patent infringers from liability of enhanced dam-
ages.90 The Court identified that the Seagate standard makes 
“dispositive the ability of the infringer to muster a reasonable 
(even though unsuccessful) defense at the infringement trial.”91 
This “pirate” behavior enables someone who “plunders a pa-
tent—infringing it without any reason to suppose his conduct is 
arguably defensible” to prevail on a claim based on the “strength 
of his attorney’s ingenuity.”92 In coming to this conclusion, the 
Supreme Court relied heavily on Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON 
Health & Fitness, Inc.,93 which struck down a two-part objective 
and subjective test before awarding attorney’s fees under § 285 
of the Patent Act.94 Adopting reasoning similar to Octane Fit-
ness, the Supreme Court noted that the infringer could prevail 
in cases where the infringer herself was not aware of the defense 
at the time of the infringing act.95 
The second key holding involved the Supreme Court further 
confirming that enhanced damages can be awarded only as a re-
sult of judicial discretion.96 In coming to this conclusion, the 
Court acknowledged the difficult balance between the need to 
facilitate innovation through patent protection and the need to 
 
 87. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1935–36. 
 88. Id. at 1933. 
 89. Id. at 1932 (quoting Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & Fitness, 
Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 553 (2014)). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1933. 
 92. Id. at 1932–33. 
 93. Id. at 1932–34 (citing Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 551–58). 
 94. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 550–51, 553–54. 
 95. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (“[C]ulpability is generally meas-
ured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct.”). 
 96. Id. at 1934–35. 
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support innovation, which is necessary to maintain a competi-
tive economy.97 The Court reasoned that the best way to enable 
this outcome would be to support the discretion of district courts, 
which are guided by 200 years of interpreting the Patent Act.98 
Third, the Court lowered the patent owner’s burden of proof 
from the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard to the 
lower “preponderance of the evidence” standard.99 The Court 
here relied on Octane Fitness to reiterate that “patent-infringe-
ment litigation has always been governed by a preponderance of 
the evidence standard” and using a heightened evidentiary 
standard is not justified.100 
Commentators were quick to point out that Halo would 
again tip the balance in favor of patentees.101 For example, the 
lowered evidentiary bar would likely lead to more filings of will-
ful infringement claims.102 Additionally, the infringer would no 
longer be able to rely on objectively reasonable defenses at 
trial.103 Rather conveniently, practitioners began advocating for 
the renewed importance of opinion of counsel letters.104 The 
 
 97. Id. at 1935 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 146 (1989)). 
 98. Id. at 1934 (“Nearly two centuries of exercising discretion in awarding 
enhanced damages in patent cases, however, has given substance to the notion 
that there are limits to that discretion. The Federal Circuit should review such 
exercises of discretion in light of the longstanding considerations we have iden-
tified as having guided both Congress and the courts.”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (quoting Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 
U.S. 545, 557 (2014)); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
390 (1983) (discussing that preponderance of the evidence is the preferred 
standard because it “allows both parties to ‘share the risk of error in roughly 
equal fashion’” (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979))); Béné v. 
Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 688 (1889) (using the preponderance of the evidence 
standard in an infringement case). 
 101. Alden Abbott, Will the Supreme Court’s Halo Electronics Decision Have 
a Desirable Halo Effect, Reducing Incentives to Infringe Patents?, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (June 21, 2016), https://www.heritage.org/economic-and-property 
-rights/commentary/will-the-supreme-courts-halo-electronics-decision-have; 
Chase Means, Has the Supreme Court Breathed New Life into Patent Trolls in 
Halo and Stryker?, IPWATCHDOG.COM (June 15, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog 
.com/2016/06/15/supreme-court-patent-trolls-halo-stryker/id=70050. 
 102. Erik R. Puknys & Yanbin Xu, Willful Infringement After Halo, FINNE-
GAN (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/willful 
-infringement-after-halo.html.  
 103. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934; Puknys & Xu, supra note 102. 
 104. Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc.: The U.S. Supreme Court 
Establishes a New Framework for Awarding Enhanced Damages in Patent 
Suits, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP: BIG MOLECULE WATCH (June 14, 2016), https:// 
www.bigmoleculewatch.com/2016/06/14/halo-electronics-inc-v-pulse-electronics 
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Seagate standard was borne out of a massive dilemma around 
how to use opinions of counsel.105 After Seagate, courts still con-
sidered them, but did not place as much dispositive weight on 
opinions of counsel.106 After Halo, commentators highlighted 
that opinions of counsel could have renewed importance as being 
indicative, though not dispositive of no willful infringement, or 
at least no enhanced damages.107 
C. ENHANCED DAMAGES & READ 
This Section addresses enhanced damages and how they are 
awarded. An award of enhanced damages is a two-step inquiry. 
First, the fact finder must determine if the accused infringer 
willfully infringed.108 If willful infringement is found, then the 
district court may utilize its discretion to enhance damages.109 
Courts have nearly unlimited discretion in determining the 
amount of the enhanced damages.110 The only guiding principle 
comes from § 284 of the Patent Act which caps the available dam-
ages at three times the compensatory amount.111 Further, courts 
are not required to explain why they decided on a certain amount 
for enhanced damages.112 Because there are no clear guidelines 
 
(advocating for the importance of opinions of counsel regarding non-infringe-
ment or patent invalidity); Supreme Court Ruling in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. 
Pulse Electronics, Inc. Relaxes Standard for Enhanced Damages in Patent 
Cases; Freedom to Operate Opinions Gain Renewed Importance, HONIGMAN 
(June 15, 2016), https://www.honigman.com/firm-newsroom-alerts-1157.html. 
 105. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 
F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 106. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc). 
 107. WBIP, L.L.C. v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (con-
cluding that when the invalidity defense was created, not just the fact that it 
was created, is important to a successful defense for willful infringement); see 
also Michele C. Bosch et al., Coming Full Circle from Seagate to Halo on Inva-
lidity Opinions, FINNEGAN (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.finnegan.com/en/ 
insights/coming-full-circle-from-seagate-to-halo-on-invalidity-opinions.html 
(“Several district courts have declined to find willful infringement when defend-
ants had pre-litigation knowledge of the asserted patents and took pre-litigation 
steps to investigate them.”). 
 108. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1935 (stating that enhanced damages 
should only be awarded after “egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical in-
fringement” have occurred). 
 109. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Halo Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1932 (stating district courts have discre-
tion to award enhanced damages and there is “‘no precise rule or formula’ for 
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to assessing enhanced damages, courts take various ap-
proaches,113 but the most common way courts assess enhanced 
damages is by turning to the Read factors.114 
In 1992, the Federal Circuit decided Read v. Portec115 and 
created a “totality of the circumstances” test to better assess 
what behavior would warrant enhanced damages.116 
The court outlined nine factors: 
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of an-
other; 
(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protec-
tion, investigated the . . . patent and formed a good-faith belief that it 
was invalid or that it was not infringed; [ ]  
(3) the infringer’s behavior . . . [in] the litigation; 
(4) [the infringer’s] size and financial condition; 
(5) [c]loseness of the case; 
(6) [d]uration of [the infringer’s] misconduct; 
(7) [r]emedial action by the [infringer]; 
(8) [infringer’s] motivation for harm; [and] 
(9) [w]hether [the infringer] attempted to conceal its misconduct.117  
In court opinions that cite the Read factors, the text of the 
case will assess each factor individually.118 For example, in 
 
awarding damages under § 284” (quoting Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON 
Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014))). 
 113. Compare Crane Sec. Techs., Inc. v. Rolling Optics AB, 337 F. Supp. 3d 
48, 57–60 (D. Mass. 2018) (conducting a Read analysis and going through each 
factor), with Forever Founds. & Frame v. Optional Prods., SA CV 13-1779-DOC 
(RNBx), 2014 WL 12585800, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014) (awarding treble 
damages but not using the Read factors to award enhanced damages). 
 114. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Im-
portantly, the Read factors are instructive, not binding. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. There was a previous three factor evaluation from Bott v. Four Star 
Corp., 807 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The factors included “(1) [W]hether 
the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another; (2) whether the 
infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent protection, investigated the scope 
of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not 
infringed, and (3) the infringer’s behavior as a party to the litigation.” Id. 
 117. Read, 970 F.2d at 826–27 (footnotes and citations omitted). Although 
Read predated Seagate, “Seagate did not change the application of the Read fac-
tors with respect to enhancement of damages when willful infringement under 
[35 U.S.C.] § 285 is found.” Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 118. See Crane Sec. Techs., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d at 57–60; see also Fitness 
Anywhere L.L.C. v. WOSS Enters. L.L.C., No. 14-CV-01725-BLF, 2018 WL 
6069511, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2018) (using the Read factors, but doing a 
much less thorough evaluation). 
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Crane Security Technologies v. Rolling Optics AB, the court be-
gins with the first Read factor, deliberate copying, and assesses 
that it “weighs in Crane’s favor” because Rolling Optics devel-
oped a technology which mirrored Crane’s claimed invention, re-
lied on a design-around, and had extensive knowledge of Crane’s 
patent portfolio.119 While this factor weighed in favor of en-
hanced damages, factors nine, four, and three did not weigh in 
favor of enhancement or have no weight in the assessment.120 
After evaluating each factor, and balancing the scales of justice, 
the court found that Crane should be awarded enhanced dam-
ages.121 
Though the nine Read factors have not changed, the en-
hanced damages outcomes have changed over time. Courts were 
awarding enhanced damages more often under the Underwater 
Devices standard than under Seagate.122 This is likely because 
there were significantly less findings of willful infringement af-
ter Seagate, therefore, less opportunities to award enhanced 
damages.123 After Halo, commentators believed that the lowered 
evidentiary bar to prove willful infringement would lead to an 
increase in findings of enhanced damages.124 The Supreme Court 
in Halo addressed the concern that the lowered standard for will-
fulness would lead to enhanced damages awards in “garden-va-
riety” patent cases.125 However, the Supreme Court reassured 
commentators by reiterating that § 284 and “two centuries” of 
 
 119. Crane Sec. Techs., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d at 57. 
 120. Id. at 57–60. 
 121. Id. This case is currently on appeal. Crane Sec. Techs., Inc. v. Rolling 
Optics AB, No. 19-1040 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2018).  
 122. Seaman, supra note 74, at 466. Seaman found that findings of enhanced 
damages were at 81.4% before Seagate and 54.9% after Seagate. Id. The results 
of this study were statistically significant (p=0.006). Id. The cases used in this 
study were all post-Read so the same standard was used across the board. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Brian Saunders, High Court Relaxes Standards for Enhanced Damages 
in District Court Patent Litigation, BAKERHOSTETLER (June 16, 2016), https:// 
www.ipintelligencereport.com/2016/06/16/high-court-relaxes-standards-for 
-enhanced-damages-in-district-court-patent-litigation. 
 125. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (“That 
balance can indeed be disrupted if enhanced damages are awarded in garden-
variety cases. As we have explained, however, they should not be. The serious-
ness of respondents’ policy concerns cannot justify imposing an artificial con-
struct such as the Seagate test on the discretion conferred under [35 U.S.C.] 
§ 284.”). 
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patent cases would protect district courts from abusing their dis-
cretion.126 
This examination of enhanced damages lends itself to two 
key conclusions as scholars continue to study enhanced damages 
and willful infringement. First, Read v. Portec is the only rule or 
formula utilized by the courts when determining whether to en-
hance damages, and if so by how much.127 Second, data shows 
that the willful infringement standard may affect the frequency 
of enhanced damages.128 
II.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: PATENT DAMAGES POST-
HALO   
The effects of the Halo decision have not yet been subject to 
much scholarly discussion. Empirical studies have been useful 
in evaluating how impactful cases that are supposed to be wa-
tershed cases have actually been.129 Of note, there is not yet an 
academic, empirical study of Halo’s actual impact on findings of 
willful infringement and enhanced damages. This Note fills that 
gap. First, it empirically evaluates Halo’s impact on willful in-
fringement findings. Second, it empirically evaluates Halo’s im-
pact on findings of enhanced damages. Third, it empirically eval-
uates any venue-based trends that may be emerging in post-
Halo cases. Finally, the section concludes with qualitative re-
sults including factors outside of Read v. Portec that were as-
sessed to determine enhanced damages. 
 
 126. Id. at 1927 (“Nearly two centuries of enhanced damage awards have 
given substance to the notion that district courts’ discretion is limited . . . .”). 
 127. Id. at 1932 (stating that there is “‘no precise rule or formula’ for award-
ing damages under § 284” (quoting Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014))); see also WBIP L.L.C. v. Kohler Co., 829 
F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-CV-
0399-BLF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93267, at *15 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2016). 
 128. Seaman, supra note 74, at 466. 
 129. Empirical studies use statistical analysis and data observations to eval-
uate causal relationships. Over the past two decades, scholars—specifically in 
patent law—have used empirical research methods to help understand how 
courts apply legal doctrines. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The 
(Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007) 
(conducting an empirical study of doctrine of equivalents decisions); Barton 
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Fed-
eral Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001). 
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A. METHODOLOGY 
This section will outline the methodology of this study. This 
section begins with a discussion of the hypotheses tested, then 
proceeds to a discussion of the data set and how the data was 
collected. After, the variables tracked and coded are listed. Fi-
nally, this section ends with the methods and results of the 
study. 
1. Hypothesis 
There were three key hypotheses tested in this study. The 
first hypothesis proposes a relationship between Halo and find-
ings of willful infringement; specifically, that Halo will increase 
findings of willful infringement.130 The second hypothesis dis-
cusses Halo’s effect on the frequency of enhanced damages 
awards and states that there will be more enhanced damages 
awards under Halo as compared to Seagate.131 
2. Data Set 
The author created an original data set for this study.132 
This Note attempted to identify all patent cases that decided 
willful infringement on the merits, starting in December 2013 
and ending in December 2018. This represents 61 months of de-
cisions divided equally before and after Halo. 
The author searched Westlaw and LexisNexis databases for 
district court decisions from December 2013 through Halo in 
June of 2016, and then from Halo through December 2018 to cre-
ate the data set. 
Based on these sources, the author compiled a list of 158 
district court cases that reached a final decision on the merits 
regarding both willful infringement and enhanced damages. Alt-
hough this figure initially appears low, it is important to note 
that the overwhelming majority of patent cases settle before 
reaching a decision on the merits. Previous studies have shown 
that only 6.2% of patent infringement claims are decided at 
 
 130. For further discussion, see supra Part I.B.3. The null hypothesis is that 
there is no difference in the proportion of willful infringement findings before or 
after Halo. The alternative hypothesis is that the proportion is greater after 
Halo than it was before. 
 131. For further discussion, see supra Part I.B.3. 
 132. This study was modeled after Professor Seaman’s study. Seaman, supra 
note 74, at 466. 
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trial.133 Further, many cases that do reach a verdict never decide 
willful infringement because the patent is found not infringed, 
the patent is found invalid, or the patentee did not assert willful 
infringement.134 
This data set included decisions from both jury and bench 
trials, and also included willful infringement found from a pre-
trial motion, such as summary judgement. The data set included 
motions to dismiss135 and judgment as a matter of law.136 
3. Variables 
In the data set, each case was coded for several variables 
using a standardized set of coding instructions. These variables 
were (1) the final decision of willful infringement in the district 
court, (2) whether enhanced damages were awarded, (3) and the 
venue of the litigation. 
4. Method 
The author ran three different statistical analyses on the 
data. First, Chi Square tests were run on both the outcomes of 
the number of willful infringement findings and the number of 
enhanced damages awards.137 This was done to test whether 
these are independent of Halo.138 The author then ran z tests for 
both of these variables to test whether Halo increased the out-
come for both.139 Finally, the author used a Type II ANOVA to 
determine whether the jurisdiction in which the case is tried has 
an effect on the number of willful infringement or enhanced 
damages awards.140 
P-values demonstrate the significance of results.141 A small 
p-value (typically ≤ 0.05) indicates that the results are likely not 
 
 133. See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringe-
ment, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 234 (2004). 
 134. Id. For reference, Judge Moore’s study only considered 2.1% of the total 
cases that were filed during the period of her study. Id. 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 136. Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) occurs either during or after trial. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 50.  
 137. E-mail from Emily Kurtz, Graduate Student, Univ. of Minn. Statistics 
Dep’t, to Veena Tripathi (Jan. 9, 2018, 14:19 CST) (on file with author). 
 138. DAVID M. LANE ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS 597 (2007), http:// 
onlinestatbook.com/Online_Statistics_Education.pdf.  
 139. See S.D. Cochran, T-Tests, UCLA (2004), http://www.stat.ucla.edu/ 
~cochran/stat10/winter/lectures/lect20.html. 
 140. LANE ET AL., supra note 138, at 515–19. 
 141. Id. at 389. 
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due to chance, and therefore are statistically significant.142 A 
larger p-value (typically > 0.05) indicates that results are more 
likely due to chance, and therefore are not statistically signifi-
cant.143 
B. RESULTS 
This Section describes the results from the data set. It ana-
lyzes these results and offers some tentative conclusions about 
willful infringement and enhanced damages both before and af-
ter Halo.144 
1. Willfulness: Statistically Significant Differences Before and 
After Halo 
The aim of this section was to determine whether findings 
of willful infringement would change after the Halo standard 
was adopted. The general assumption was that Halo was a wa-
tershed case that would lead to noticeable differences in infringe-
ment outcomes and would make the process more favorable to 
the patentee.145 
Table 1 shows results from the findings of willful infringe-
ment study. The study evaluated how often disputes ended in 
findings of willful infringement before and after Halo.146 First, a 
Chi Square test result shows that willful infringement findings 
are not independent of Halo, therefore establishing a statisti-
cally significant relationship between the two.147 Next, a z test 
was run to determine whether there was any difference in the 
number of willful infringement findings before or after Halo. 
Here, the proportion of cases that ended in willful infringement 
findings were greater after Halo than before.148 As shown in Ta-
ble 1, 22.8% of cases reviewed had a willful infringement finding 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. All studies were done using the program R. See The R Project for Sta-
tistical Computing, R FOUND., https://www.r-project.org (last visited Feb. 22, 
2019). 
 145. Supra Part I.B.3. 
 146. To reiterate, the data set included decisions from both jury and bench 
trials, pre-trial motions, motions to dismiss and judgements as a matter of law. 
However, the vast majority (68%) of the decisions for willful infringement came 
from jury determinations. 
 147. The p-value here is 4.637e-05 . This is significantly less than the p-value 
of 0.05, the standard for determining statistical significance. LANE ET AL., supra 
note 138. 
 148. There is a 95% confidence level with this factor. 
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before Halo versus 55.7% willful infringement finding after 
Halo. 
This result is not surprising. Under the previous Seagate 
standard, patentees were required to establish both objective 
recklessness and subjective recklessness.149 Furthermore, the 
data taken for the pre-Halo category were all post-Bard. This 
means that the first prong of willfulness, in the two-prong in-
quiry, was given to a judge before a jury was allowed to evaluate 
the evidentiary record.150 Under Halo, the evidentiary record 
was given to the jury at the time of infringement if the case went 
to a jury trial.151 Moreover, patentees need only prove that the 
infringing party knew or should have known they were infring-
ing.152 Further, there is a lowered evidentiary standard to prove 
this by.153 This likely indicates that the change in evidentiary 
standard and the demolished “rigidity” of the Seagate framework 
did have an impact on the outcome of cases. 
 
Table 1. Willfulness Findings Before and After Halo 
 Before Halo (Dec. 
2013-June 2016) 
After Halo (July 
2016-Dec. 2018) 
% Willful 22.8% 55.7% 
p = 7.587e-06 
2. Enhanced Damages: Statistically Significant Differences 
Before and After Halo 
A second major focus of this study was determining whether 
enhanced damages were affected by Halo.154 As mentioned ear-
lier, the decision in Halo would theoretically lead to an increase 
in willful infringement findings.155 First, Halo’s standard re-
 
 149. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc). 
 150. See Bard Peripheral Vascular v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 
1006–07 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 151. See supra Part I.B.3. Importantly, this does not include a motion to dis-
miss, which through this empirical evaluation was the most popular action to 
bring. 
 152. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 154. For a more detailed view of the enhanced damages standard, see supra 
Part I. 
 155. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016); 
see also supra Part I.B.2. 
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placed Seagate’s “objective recklessness” standard, which lim-
ited a finding for willful infringement in only the most egregious 
cases.156 Under Seagate, scholars believed the overlap between 
the Seagate factors and the Read factors would lead to findings 
of egregiousness in almost all cases, because findings of egre-
giousness would be few and far between.157 However, the empir-
ical data rejected this hypothesis. This is likely because the 
standard for willful infringement was decreased and the bar for 
egregiousness remained the same. As a result, there were a large 
percentage of cases that were not egregious enough to warrant 
enhanced damages.158 
After abrogating Seagate, scholars believed that the flood 
gates would open to a sea of enhanced damages awards.159 As 
stated above, awarding enhanced damages is a two-step pro-
cess.160 First, a party must establish willful infringement.161 
Courts cannot award enhanced damages without a finding of 
willful infringement.162 Theoretically, if there were more cases of 
willful infringement, there would be more opportunities for 
awarding enhanced damages.163 Based on this assumption, the 
hypothesis tested was whether the lowered standard for deter-
mining willful infringement post-Halo would increase the num-
ber of enhanced damages awards. This test was completed in us-
ing the exact two-step process for evaluating willful 
infringement outcomes. First, a Chi Square test was done to es-
tablish whether enhanced damages and Halo were independent 
of one another. The Chi Square test statistic was below the rele-
vant p-value, thus demonstrating that enhanced damages are 
also dependent on Halo.164 Second, a z test was used to deter-
mine whether there was any difference in the number of willful 
infringement findings before or after Halo. 
 
 156. See id. at 1932, 1935–36. 
 157. Seaman, supra note 74, at 466 (“In addition, the overlap between the 
Read factors for enhanced damages and post-Seagate willfulness factors also 
suggested enhanced damages would be awarded most times when willfulness 
was found.”). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 464. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. The p-value here is 0.0050308 . This is still less than the relevant p-
value of 0.05, the standard for determining statistical significance. LANE ET AL., 
supra note 138. 
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The studies shown in Table 2 demonstrate that enhanced 
damages are dependent on Halo. Further, this test demonstrates 
that damages are increased 19% more often than pre-Halo cases. 
Moreover, these results are statistically significant. 
 
Table 2. Enhancement Findings Before and After Halo 











3. Venue Has No Statistically Significant Effect on Willful 
Infringement or Enhanced Damages Outcomes. 
The last study concerned the effects patent venue might 
have on the outcome of infringement actions. Type II ANOVA 
was used to assess whether venue had any effect on both en-
hanced damages awards and willful infringement findings. The 
null hypothesis for an ANOVA is that all groups have the same 
mean.165 In this context, this means that the proportion of cases 
that end in willful infringement findings, or enhanced damages 
awards, is the same over all jurisdictions. The alternative is that 
at least one jurisdiction differs. 
Based on the findings from the ANOVA study, there is not 
sufficient evidence to say that jurisdictions differ in the propor-
tion of cases that end in willful infringement findings or en-
hanced damages awards.166 This finding was limited because the 
assumptions for ANOVA were violated and the data was not nor-
mal. Further, the data was not balanced, meaning that there 
were not an equal number of cases from each venue.167  
 
 165. See ANOVA, STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CONSULTING, L.L.C., https:// 
www.statisticallysignificantconsulting.com/Anova.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 
2019). 
 166. See infra App. 
 167. Patent infringement cases are heard in either the (1) defendant’s state 
of incorporation or (2) where the defendant commits an act of infringement and 
has a regular and established place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012); see 
also TC Heartland L.L.C. v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands L.L.C., 137 S. Ct. 1514, 
1517 (2017) (holding that a defendant resides in its state of incorporation). A 
majority of patent cases are heard in the Eastern District of Texas and the Dis-
trict of Delaware. See Steve Brachmann, 2017 Saw Fewest Patent Lawsuits 
Filed Since 2011, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
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Table 3. Infringement Cases Post-Halo by Venue 
(July 2016-December 2018) 
Venue Number of Cases Heard 
Delaware 20 
Eastern District of Texas 7 




However, the outcome of willful infringement still had a low 
p-value (0.054) which was close to the threshold of statistical sig-
nificance. This shows that willful infringement, perhaps with 
more data points, may actually be dependent on venue. This is 
an area for future study and this hypothesis should be further 
explored. 
III.  EVALUATING WILLFULNESS AND ENHANCED 
DAMAGES AFTER HALO: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS 
OF HALO?   
This Note is the first real empirical evaluation of Halo’s im-
pact on willful infringement and enhanced damages. The results 
show that Halo had a significant impact on the willful infringe-
ment and enhanced damages outcomes of patent infringement 
cases at the district court level.168 The Supreme Court lambasted 
the Seagate standard, stating that it protected the most mali-
cious infringers and only required a particularly creative lawyer 
to successfully avoid a willful infringement finding.169 This study 
demonstrates that there was a statistically significant shift in 
findings of willful infringement and enhanced damages post-
Halo. This Section discusses some of the implications of this find-
ing on determinizations of willful infringement and enhanced 
damages. 
A. THE RENEWED IMPORTANCE OF JURIES POST-HALO 
In recent years, there have been several challenges to the 
use of juries in patent trials. Scholars have highlighted a jury’s 
 
2018/01/31/2017-fewest-patent-lawsuits-filed-2011/id=92952/. 
 168. See supra Table 1 & Table 2. 
 169. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (dis-
cussing that the “pirate” behavior enables someone who “plunders a patent – 
infringing it without any reason to suppose his conduct is arguably defensible” 
to prevail on a claim based on the “strength of [her] attorney’s ingenuity”). 
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lack of expertise around patent law, which is both a particularly 
nuanced topic and complex legal standard.170 Complaints about 
the use of juries in patent cases have emphasized the lack of for-
mal education and training of the individual jurors,171 the natu-
ral tendency of jurors to be swayed by tangential, emotional fac-
tors, bias or prejudice,172 and the high level of complexity in 
patent cases.173 
This study lends support to the notion that juries may be 
pro-patentee once infringement is established. Importantly, will-
ful infringement only arises after assessing validity and or obvi-
ousness. In the cases studied, 55.7% of post-Halo cases found 
willful infringement, as compared to 22.8% of cases pre-Halo. 
This signals a return to the levels of infringement seen under 
Underwater Devices, when 68% of the jury cases found willful 
infringement, an extremely pro-patentee outcome.174 This has 
been supported by other empirical findings. In a study done by 
jury consultants to assess the bias of jurors, 66% of mock jurors 
 
 170. Judicial Panel Discussions on Science and the Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 
1127, 1145 (1993) (“Honest to God, I don’t see how you could try a patent matter 
to a jury. Goodness, I’ve gotten involved in a few of these things. It’s like some-
body hit you between your eyes with a four-by-four. It’s factually so compli-
cated.” (statement of Judge Covello, U.S. District Judge, Dist. of Conn.)). 
 171. See, e.g., Matt Krantz, Patent Suits Try Patience of High-Tech Compa-
nies, INV. BUS. DAILY, Dec. 9, 1996, at A6 (“Because patent cases can last up to 
three months, better-educated potential jurors are excused from serving. Only 
people with nothing better to do can give up 12 weeks listening to lawyers talk 
about high tech.” (internal quotation omitted)); Richard B. Schmitt, Juries’ Role 
in Patent Cases Reconsidered, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at B6 (quoting AT&T 
lawyers who, after losing a jury trial, complained that the jury consisted of “un-
employed laborers and housewives . . . [who did not] understand that stuff”). 
 172. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical 
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 373 n.33 (2000) [hereinafter 
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases] (quoting a Chief Patent Counsel stat-
ing, “I have won and lost cases with juries, and in both situations, the jury rea-
soning was not related to the facts”); id. at 373 (quoting a Chief Patent Counsel 
stating, “[j]urors’ decisions are based on emotional perceptions of good guy vs. 
bad guy”); see also Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 875 (2002) (finding that jury demands are impacted 
by popular perceptions of jury bias against foreigners, corporations, out-of-state 
parties, and infringers). In a 2000 study, Federal Circuit Judge Kimberly Moore 
found that a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and a clear-and-convinc-
ing standard resulted in nearly the same percentage of pro-patentee outcomes 
in infringement cases. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra, at 373 
(“This contrast with judges’ tendencies suggests that juries may be swayed by 
bias and may not be giving the evidentiary burden much significance.”). 
 173. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 174. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra note 172, at 391 (deter-
mining that willful infringement was found 71% of the time by juries). 
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participating in the study supported the patent owner after they 
were given a neutral statement of facts without any argument 
or evidence from either side.175 The study showed that jurors also 
have a high-regard for inventors and believe the review process 
for obtaining the patent is rigorous.176 
A major caveat of this study is that after Bard, the first 
prong of Seagate was given to the judge.177 Thus, juries were only 
presented with information regarding subjective willfulness af-
ter the judge determined that the defendant’s behavior was ob-
jectively willful.178 This would lead to the inquiry of whether the 
drastic difference in outcome is due to the jury or the standard. 
Other empirical studies can be used to fill this gap. In his study 
evaluating the impact of Seagate, Professor Christopher Seaman 
demonstrated that over 37% of cases between 2007 and 2010 had 
outcomes of willful infringement.179 The results in Table 1 show 
that the post-Bard cases found willful infringement in about 27% 
of cases.180 Thus, even though there is only a slight difference in 
the percentages, it may still demonstrate that juries tend to lean 
in favor of the patentee in infringement actions 
In Justice Breyer’s Halo concurrence, he states that the un-
certainty of jury outcomes can help negotiating parties deter-
mine whether they want to continue with the costly action of pa-
tent litigation.181 If anything, it seems that patentees may want 
to continue infringement litigation actions, while infringers may 
want to encourage settlement to avoid costly litigation. Though 
this Note does not advocate for a complete removal of juries in 
willful infringement disputes, it does suggest that attorneys and 
 
 175. Casey Anderson & Chuck Kauffman, Why US Juries Are Pro-Plaintiff, 
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Feb. 2009, at 42, 43. 
 176. See id. at 42–43 (noting that a recent study found plaintiffs won more 
than 63% of patent infringement jury trials and discussing the various factors 
for juries’ pro-patent tendencies). 
 177. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Seaman, supra note 74, at 441. 
 180. The results in Table 1 come from a survey of cases post-Bard. See infra 
App. 
 181. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1937 (2016) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“Will a jury find that the company behaved ‘recklessly,’ 
simply for failing to spend considerable time, effort, and money obtaining expert 
views about whether some or all of the patents described in the letter apply to 
its activities (and whether those patents are even valid)? These investigative 
activities can be costly. Hence, the risk of treble damages can encourage the 
company to settle, or even abandon any challenged activity.”). 
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judges should be aware of potential jury biases in infringement 
actions. 
B. JUDGES SHOULD PROVIDE MORE TRANSPARENCY WITH 
ENHANCED DAMAGES CALCULATIONS POST-HALO. 
Another key takeaway from this study is the lack of discus-
sion around why a judge is choosing to enhance damages by a 
certain degree. The surveyed cases demonstrate an emerging 
trend: for judges that choose to assess the Read factors, they of-
ten cite those factors as their basis for the degree of the enhanced 
damages awards.182 However, this approach still does not lead to 
consistent outcomes. For example, in Barry v. Medtronic the 
Eastern District of Texas awarded 20% enhanced damages when 
four out of the nine Read factors favored enhancement.183 In con-
trast, in Apple v. Samsung, the Northern District of California 
awarded 30% enhanced damages when four out of the nine Read 
factors favored enhancement.184 Even still, it is possible that four 
factors may weigh in favor of enhanced damages and the judge 
can ultimately decline to award them. Not only is there a lack of 
consistency with the degree of enhancement, it provides a weak 
basis for other jurisdictions looking for guidance when assessing 
whether to award them.185 
The function of the Read factors is to determine whether to 
enhance damages.186 Though Read is optional in this inquiry, it 
provides consistency among jurisdictions and is often cited by 
district courts when assessing enhanced damages.187 But Read 
is a poor marker for determining how much to enhance damages 
by. Courts should continue to exercise judicial discretion in 
awarding enhanced damages but should be required to more 
aptly explain why a certain amount is being awarded. 
A possible approach would be to use a model similar to 
awarding compensatory damages. An example of how this 
 
 182. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 258 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1036 (N.D. 
Cal. 2017) (“[T]he Court exercises its discretion and finds that increasing the 
damages award by 30% of the compensatory damages award is a sufficiently 
punitive sanction for Samsung’s conduct in this case.”). 
 183. See Barry v. Medtronic, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 3d 107, 123 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 
 184. Apple, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 1036. 
 185. Canon, Inc. v. Color Imaging, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 
2018) (citing a range of cases that enhanced damages between 10% and 30% to 
justify the 20% enhanced damage award). 
 186. Presidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 875 F.3d 1369, 
1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 187. Id. 
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should work is VirnetX v. Apple.188 Here, the Eastern District of 
Texas used a modified lost profits analysis to determine the de-
gree of enhanced damages.189 Here, the alleged infringer had 
been infringing for a period of years and the court calculated the 
annual lost profits and added them on top of the compensatory 
damages that already included reasonable royalties and lost 
profits.190 A model similar to the one used in VirnetX may be 
beneficial in scenarios where the judge is enhancing damages to 
ensure that the infringer is actually—as opposed to superfi-
cially—injured by the damages award.191 
A major caveat to the suggestion that the degree of en-
hanced damages should be more standardized comes from the 
opinion in Halo.192 There, the Supreme Court clearly stated that 
district court judges should not be required to adhere to a for-
mula of enhanced damages.193 This does not require courts to 
award damages even if all of the Read factors are met. However, 
this does require judges to undertake a more fact-intensive in-
quiry to describe their rationale besides simply listing the fac-
tors.194 However, because enhanced damages can have a large 
impact on both the viability of a company195 and the future of 
innovation,196 greater transparency in district court decisions 
may more effectively achieve the goals intended for enhanced 
damages. An additional example of how to more effectively 
award enhanced damages may come from courts considering fac-
tors outside of Read.197 
C. CONSIDERING EXTRA-READ FACTORS: WHY ARE JUDGES 
RELUCTANT TO CITE NON-READ FACTORS? 
Another interesting result of the study is that courts appear 
to be reluctant to rely on factors outside of Read to either support 
 
 188. 324 F. Supp. 3d 836 (E.D. Tex. 2017). 
 189. Id. at 869–70. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Dam-
ages and Attorneys’ Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 
326–27 (2004). 
 192. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935–36 (2016). 
(discussing that there should not be any rule or formula by which judges should 
enhance damages). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 1933–34. 
 195. Id. at 1937–38 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 196. See Cotter, supra note 191, at 293. 
 197. See infra Part III.C. 
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or deny an award of enhanced damages. Out of the cases sur-
veyed, only one case cited a non-Read factor when determining 
whether to award enhanced damages.198 Importantly, Read is 
merely a suggestion to district courts on how to evaluate whether 
damages should be enhanced and does not attempt to define the 
bounds of what constitutes egregious behavior.199 This finding 
raises the question of why courts choose not to assess factors out-
side of Read. 
One possibility is that the Read factors are comprehensive. 
The nine listed factors identify behavior such as bad-faith nego-
tiations and deliberate copying as behavior that weighs in favor 
of enhanced damages.200 Courts that are unsure about what con-
stitutes sanctionable behavior can simply look to Read.201 An-
other possibility is that courts are reluctant to over-deter inno-
vative behavior, and adding additional factors on top of Read 
may negatively impact innovation.202 For example, an inventor 
may choose not to take a particular design-around technique 
based on the prospect of undue holdup of innovation, mounting 
legal expenses and costly litigation.203 An inventor may consider 
these factors detractors in the process and choose not to innovate 
as a result. 
However, the Read factors should not end the inquiry and 
other factors should be evaluated when courts decide whether to 
enhance damages. An example comes from the only post-Halo 
case surveyed that considered the potential impact that the en-
hanced damages award would have on social welfare; the case 
specifically concerned access to life-saving medications.204 In 
 
 198. Idenix Pharm. L.L.C. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703 (D. 
Del. 2017) (finding that an enhanced damages award would lead to negative 
consequences for public health and denying enhanced damages even though the 
Read factors pointed to infringement). 
 199. See Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P., 867 F.3d 1229, 1244 
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (describing the Read factors as “non-exclusive”); see also Pre-
sidio Components, Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 875 F.3d 1369, 1382–83 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 200. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 201. Andrew J. Kennedy, Enhanced Damages on the Rise for Willful Patent 
Infringement, LITIG. NEWS, Fall 2016, at 4 (noting that the Read factors remain 
relevant after Halo). 
 202. See Karshtedt, supra note 1, at 1536–37 (discussing the role of enhanced 
damages in promoting overdeterrence of innovation).   
 203. See id. 
 204. See Idenix Pharm. L.L.C. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 694, 703 
(D. Del. 2017) (finding that an enhanced damages award would lead to negative 
consequences for public health). 
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Idenix Pharmaceuticals v. Gilead Sciences, the District of Dela-
ware refused to award enhanced damages based on the public 
health benefit of the infringed product. The product in question 
was directed to a Hepatitis C Virus treatment. The presiding 
judge did not “‘bless’ th[is] type of underhanded corporate pi-
racy,” which included both confidentiality breaches and deliber-
ate copying, which was at issue in this case.205 However, though 
some of the Read factors weighed in favor of enhancement, the 
judge determined that the Gilead’s conduct was not the type that 
the patent system should attempt to deter.206 The efficacy of the 
drug and the societal interest in encouraging such discoveries 
made it such that “without both parties’ contributions, humanity 
may well have been deprived of a cure for HCV.”207 With matters 
of public health at issue, the presiding judge determined that 
assigning enhanced damages was not appropriate.208 
This is in contrast to the prevailing theme in U.S. patent 
litigation. One of the most popular areas for patent infringement 
litigation is the area of pharmaceuticals.209 Further, patent-
holders often prevail in cases related to pharmaceuticals and 
pharmaceutical patent litigation often has the highest median 
damages awards.210 The District of Delaware’s is a unique juris-
diction and most jurisdictions do not utilize factors outside of 
Read in their decision-making process. Moreover, perhaps future 
research should consider this area an avenue for future research 
and development. 
 
 205. See id. at 697. Of note, the jury found willful infringement in this case 
even though it was a life-saving drug. Id. 
 206. Id. at 704 (“The Court—and, more generally, the patent system—wants 
to encourage, and not deter, innovation on existing ideas, and exploration and 
investment (including in the form of massive expenditures) in related inven-
tions that may reasonably appear to be outside the scope of another patentee’s 
claims.”). 
 207. Id. (“Under the totality of the circumstances, society’s interests in de-
terrence of willful patent infringement does not justify enhancing damages 
here.”). 
 208. Id. 
 209. See LANDEN ANSELL ET AL., PWC, 2018 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 11 
(2018), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2018 
-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 210. Id. at 11–12 (finding that 15% of all patent litigation from 1998 to 2017 
originated from infringement disputes about the biotech/pharma industry, and 
that median damages awards in biotech/pharma cases are over $20 million, 
compared to the national average median patent damages award of $5.9 mil-
lion). 
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  CONCLUSION   
The data in this Note confirms the predictions surrounding 
Halo’s impact on willful patent infringement and enhanced dam-
ages. Courts after Halo find willful infringement in slightly over 
55.7% of cases, and judges enhance damages in 29.1% of cases. 
This Note also provides several implications of Halo. First, the 
study lends empirical support to the assertion that Halo affected 
findings of willful infringement and enhanced damages. Second, 
this study demonstrates that judges rarely consult factors out-
side of Read to determine whether to enhance damages or not. 
Third, this study shows that although venue was not a statisti-
cally significant factor in determining the outcome of willfulness 
and enhanced damage cases, it is an area for further research. 
As mentioned, patent damages is an incredibly complex area of 
law. It contains many nuances and is quickly evolving. Without 
legislative evaluation and resources, judges and attorneys must 
critique the current standard to ensure that it is achieving the 
intended results. Based on the findings in this Note, Halo 
achieved its intended effect of creating a more flexible standard, 
but there remain areas for improvement to obtain a more robust 
patent system.  
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  APPENDIX   
Z TESTS 
Willful Infringement Findings 
(Pre-Halo) 
Willful Infringement Findings 
(Post-Halo) 
Estimated Proportion: 0.228 Estimated Proportion: 0.557 
* p-value: 7.587e-06 
** 95% confident true difference in proportions lies above 0.257 
Enhanced Damages (Pre-Halo) Enhanced Damages (Post-Halo) 
Estimated Proportion: 0.101 Estimated Proportion: 0.291 
* p-value: 0.001273 
** 95% confident true difference in proportions lies above 0.044 
CHI SQUARE TESTS 
Willful Infringement Findings 
(Pre-Halo) 
Willful Infringement Findings 
(Post-Halo) 
Estimated Proportion: 0.228 Estimated Proportion: 0.557 
* p-value: 4.637e-05 
Enhanced Damages (Pre-Halo) Enhanced Damages (Post-Halo) 
Estimated Proportion: 0.101 Estimated Proportion: 0.291 
* p-value: 0.005038 
ANOVA 
Willful Infringement Findings by Venue 





Jurisdiction 7.6436 24 1.698 0.05426 
Residuals 10.1285 54   
 
Enhanced Damages by Venue 







4.3009 24 1.0083 0.4728 
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9 IpVenture, Inc. v. 
CeL.L.C.o P'ship, 
No. C 10-04755 
JSW, 2011 WL 
207978, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 
21, 2011). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
10 L.C. Eldridge 
Sales Co., v. Ju-
rong Shipyards, 
Pte., Ltd., No. 
6:11CV599, 2014 
WL 12597719, at 
*5 (E.D. Tex. 
Sept. 23, 2014).  
E.D. Tex. No No 
11 Butamax Ad-
vanced Biofuels 
L.L.C. v. Gevo, 
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 
3d 632, 646 (D. 
Del. 2015). 
D. Del. No No 
12 W. Coast Trends, 




3819878, at *1 
(D. Utah May 1, 
2015). 
D. Utah No No 
13 LSI Corp. v. 




8178869, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 
2015). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
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14 Dane Techs., Inc. 
v. Gatekeeper 
Sys., Inc., 135 F. 
Supp. 3d 970, 
989–90 (D. Minn. 
2015). 
D. Minn. No No 




Inc., 85 F. Supp. 
3d 768, 777 (D. 
Del. 2015). 
D. Del. No No 
16 Clear with Com-
puts., L.L.C. v. 
Fishing Holdings 
L.L.C., No. 6:13-
CV-161, 2014 WL 
12628465, at *3 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 
21, 2014). 
E.D. Tex. No No 
17 WCM Indus., 




2771790, at *6 
(W.D. Tenn. May 
12, 2016). 
W.D. Tenn. Yes Yes 
18 Aqua Shield, Inc. 
v. Inter Pool 
Cover Team, No. 
2:09-CV-13 TS, 
2015 WL 
4727955, at *1 
(D. Utah Aug. 10, 
2015).  
D. Utah Yes No 
19 Glob. Traffic 
Techs., L.L.C. v. 
Emtrac Sys., 
Inc., No. 10-4110 
ADM/JJG, 2014 
WL 1663420, at 
*13–14 (D. Minn. 
Apr. 25, 2014). 
D. Minn. Yes Yes 
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20 Blue Spike, 
L.L.C. v. Adobe 
Sys., Inc., No. 14-
cv-01647-YGR 
(JSC), 2015 WL 
335842, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 
26, 2015). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
21 Master Lock Co. 
v. Toledo & Co, 
Inc., No. 13-1658 
(PAD), 2014 WL 
11099433, at *1 
(D.P.R. June 12, 
2014). 
D.P.R. No No 
22 OPTi, Inc. v. VIA 
Techs., Inc., No. 
2:10-CV-00279-
JRG, 2014 WL 
3853429, at *2 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 
4, 2014). 
E.D. Tex. No No 
23 Incom Corp. v. 




4942032, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 
2016). 
C.D. Cal. No No 
24 Iron Gate Sec., 
Inc. v. Lowe’s 
Cos., No. 15-cv-
8814 (SAS), 2016 
WL 1070853, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 16, 2016). 
S.D.N.Y. No No 
25 Protegrity Corp. 
v. AJB Software 
Design, Inc., No. 
3:13-CV-01484 
(RNC), 2015 WL 
461041, at *3 (D. 
Conn. Feb. 3, 
2015). 
D. Conn. No No 
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31 Georgetown Rail 
Equip. Co. v. 
Holland L.P., 
No. 6:13-CV-
366, 2016 WL 
3346084, at *1 
(E.D. Tex. June 
16, 2016), aff 'd, 
867 F.3d 1229 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
26 Telebrands Corp. 
v. GMC Ware, 
Inc., No. CV15-
03121 SJO (JCx), 
2016 WL 
6237914, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 
2016). 
C.D. Cal. No No 
27 Verdict Form at 




RSP, 2017 WL 
4237194 (E.D. 
Tex. Sept. 8, 
2017). 
E.D. Tex. Yes No 
28 VIA Techs., Inc. 
v. ASUS Comput. 
Int'l, No. 14-cv-
03586-BLF, 2015 
WL 3809382, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal. 
June 18, 2015). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
29 M2M Sols. L.L.C. 
v. Motorola Sols., 
Inc., No. 12-33-
RGA, 2016 WL 
70814, at *16 (D. 
Del. Jan. 6, 
2016). 
D. Del. No No 
30 Asetek Danmark 
A/S v. CMI USA, 
Inc., No. 13-cv-
00457-JST, 2015 
WL 5568360, at 
*22–23 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 22, 
2015). 
N.D. Cal. Yes Yes 
  




Corp. v. Yahoo! 
Inc., 689 F. 
Supp. 2d 858 
(E.D. Tex. 2010). 
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
33 Ceiva Logic Inc. 
v. Frame Media 
Inc., No. SACV 
08-00636-JVS, 
2014 WL 
7338840, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 
19, 2014). 
C.D. Cal. No No 
34 Sonos Inc. v. 
D&M Holdings 
Inc., 297 F. 
Supp. 3d 501 (D. 
Del. 2017). 
D. Del. Yes No 
35 Forever Founds. 
& Frame, L.L.C. 
v. Optional 





Cal. Dec. 19, 
2014). 
C.D. Cal. Yes Yes 
36 Deckers Outdoor 
Corp. v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 45 
F. Supp. 3d 1181 
(C.D. Cal. 2014). 
C.D. Cal. No No 
37 ART+COM In-
novationpool 
GmbH v. Google 
Inc., 155 F. 
Supp. 3d 489 (D. 
Del. 2016). 
D. Del. No No 
38 XY, L.L.C. v. 
Trans Ova Ge-




1391615, at *7 
(D. Colo. Apr. 8, 
2016). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
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39 Greatbatch Ltd. 
v. AVX Corp., 
No. 13-723-LPS, 
2015 WL 
9171042 (D. Del. 
Dec. 11, 2015). 
D. Del. No No 
40 Vasudevan Soft-
ware, Inc. v. 
TIBCO Software 
Inc., No. C 11-
06638 RS, 2012 
WL 1831543 
(N.D. Cal. May 
18, 2012). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
41 Tex. Advanced 
Optoelectronic 
Sols., Inc. v. In-




Tex. Apr. 26, 
2016). 
E.D. Tex. Yes No 





4955087, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 
30, 2014). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
43 Celsis In Vitro, 
Inc. v. CellzDi-
rect, Inc., 83 F. 
Supp. 3d 774 
(N.D. Ill. 2015). 
N.D. Ill. No No 
44 Masimo Corp. v. 
Philips Elec. N. 
Am. Corp., 62 F. 
Supp. 3d 368, 
392 (D. Del. 
2014). 
D. Del. No No 




WL 3945875, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. 
June 26, 2015). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
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46 Bovino v. Le-
venger Co., No. 
14-CV-00122-
RM-KLM, 2015 
WL 1064082 (D. 
Colo. Mar. 9, 
2015). 
D. Colo. No No 
47 Master Lock Co. 
v. Toledo & Co., 
No. 13-1658 
(PAD), 2014 WL 
11099433 
(D.P.R. June 12, 
2014). 
D.P.R. No No 
48 Spherix Inc. v. 
Cisco Sys., Inc., 
No. 14-393-SLR, 
2015 WL 
1517435, at *3 
(D. Del. Mar. 31, 
2015). 
D. Del. No No 
49 Addiction & De-
toxification 




(E.D. Mich. Feb. 
13, 2015). 
E.D. Mich. No No 
50 Allure Energy, 
Inc. v. Nest 




Tex. May 11, 
2015). 
E.D. Tex. No No 
51 ProCom Heat-
ing, Inc. v. GHP 
Grp., Inc., No. 
1:13CV-00163-
GNS, 2016 WL 
3659137 (W.D. 
Ky. May 11, 
2016). 
W.D. Ky. No No 
52 Word to Info, 
Inc. v. Google 
Inc., 140 F. 
Supp. 3d 986, 
N.D. Cal. No No 
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997 (N.D. Cal. 
2015). 
53 CTP Innova-





11997838, at *3 
(S.D. Fla. July 
15, 2014). 







1883937, at *3 
(D. Del. Apr. 23, 
2015). 
D. Del. No No 
55 DRG-Int'l, Inc. 
v. Bachem Ams., 
Inc., No. CV-15-
7276-MWF 
(SSx), 2016 WL 
3460791, at *11 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 
5, 2016). 
C.D. Cal. No No 
56 Alfred E. Mann 
Found. for Sci. 
Research v. 
Cochlear Corp., 




Cal. Mar. 31, 
2015). 
C.D Cal. No No 
57 Open Text S.A. 
v. Box, Inc., No. 
13-CV-04910-
JD, 2015 WL 
603144 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 11, 
2015). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
58 Pentair Water 
Pool & Spa, Inc. 
v. Hayward In-
dus., Inc., No. 
CV 11-10280-
C.D. Cal. No No 
  





Cal. Oct. 20, 
2014). 
59 IP Power Hold-




(ANx), 2014 WL 
12589630 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 3, 
2014). 
C.D. Cal. Yes No 
60 Impulse Tech. 




1737663 (D. Del. 
Apr. 9, 2015).  
D. Del. No No 
61 Spherix Inc. v. 
Juniper Net-
works, Inc., No. 
14-578-SLR, 
2015 WL 
1517508, at *3 
(D. Del. Mar. 31, 
2015). 
D. Del. No No 
62 Unisone Strate-





12077477, at *4 
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 
16, 2013). 
S.D. Cal. No No 
63 Bonutti Skeletal 
Innovations, 
L.L.C. v. Globus 
Med. Inc., No. 
14-6650, 2015 
WL 3755223, at 
*12 (E.D. Pa. 
June 15, 2015). 
E.D. Pa. No No 
64 Core Wireless 
Licensing 
S.A.R.L. v. Ap-
ple Inc., No. 
E.D. Tex. Yes No 
  





at *5 (E.D. Tex. 







(E.D. Tex. Aug. 
14, 2015). 
65 Smartflash 
L.L.C. v. Apple 
Inc., No. 
6:13cv447-JRG-
KNM, 2015 WL 
661276, at *5 
(E.D. Tex. Feb. 
13, 2015). 
E.D. Tex. Yes No 






Va. Nov. 20, 
2014). 
E.D. Va. Yes No 
67 WBIP, L.L.C. v. 
Kohler Co., No. 
11-10374-NMG, 
2014 WL 
585854, at *10 
(D. Mass. Feb. 
12, 2014). 
D. Mass. Yes Yes 
68 Va. Innovation 
Scis., Inc. v. 
Samsung Elecs. 
Co., 983 F. 
Supp. 2d 713, 
749 (E.D. Va. 
2014), vacated, 
614 F. App’x 503 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
E.D. Va. No No 
69 Trading Techs. 





N.D. Ill. Yes No 
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Ill. Mar. 18, 
2015). 







(ANx), 2014 WL 
12588293, at 
*12 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 30, 2014). 
C.D. Cal. No No 
71 Signal IP, Inc. v. 
Volkswagen 
Grp. of Am., 




10453350, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 
19, 2014). 
C.D. Cal. No No 





4467837, at *15 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 
9, 2014), rev’d, 
816 F.3d 788 
(Fed. Cir. 2016), 
vacated in part 
and aff ’d in part 
on reh’g en banc, 
839 F.3d 1034 
(Fed. Cir. 2016). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
73 KEG Kanal-
reinigungstech-
nik, GmbH v. 
Laimer, No. 
1:11-CV-01948-
ELR, 2015 WL 
11123311, at 
*18–19 (N.D. 
Ga. Mar. 24, 
2015). 
N.D. Ga. No No 
74 In re Method of 
Processing Etha-
nol Byproducts 
S.D. Ind. No No 
  





303 F. Supp. 3d 
791, 908–09 
(S.D. Ind. 2014). 
75 Edwards Lifesci-
ences AG v. 
CoreValve, Inc., 
No. CV 08-91 
(GMS), 2014 WL 
1493187, at *7 
(D. Del. Apr. 15, 
2014). 
D. Del. Yes No 
76 AAT Bioquest, 





7708332, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 
30, 2015). 
N.D. Cal. Yes Yes 
77 Zond, Inc. v. SK 




346008, at *6 
(D. Mass. Jan. 
31, 2014). 
D. Mass. No No 






5091974, at *5 
(W.D. Okla. 
Aug. 28, 2015). 
W.D. Okla. No No 
79 Bush Seismic 
Techs. L.L.C. v. 
Am. Gem Soc’y, 
No. 2:14-cv-
1809-JRG, 2016 
WL 9115381, at 
*3 (E.D. Tex. 
Apr. 13, 2016). 
E.D. Tex. No No 
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Post-Halo Cases 




1 Trs. of Bos. Univ. 
v. Everlight El-
ecs. Co., 212 F. 
Supp. 3d 254, 
258 (D. Mass. 
2016). 




Calidad, S.A. v. 
Blue Ridge X-
Ray Co., 226 F. 
Supp. 3d 520, 
531–32 
(W.D.N.C. 2016), 
aff ’d, 721 F. 
App’x 989 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018). 
W.D.N.C. Yes No 
3 Barry v. Med-
tronic, Inc., 250 
F. Supp. 3d 107, 
119 (E.D. Tex. 
2017). 
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
4 Arctic Cat Inc. v. 
Bombardier Rec-
reational Prods., 
Inc., 198 F. Supp. 
3d 1343, 1348–
49, 1354 (S.D. 
Fla. 2016), aff ’d, 
876 F.3d 1350 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
S.D. Fla. Yes Yes 
5 Apple Inc. v. 
Samsung Elecs. 
Co., 258 F. Supp. 
3d 1013, 1029, 
1036 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
N.D. Cal. Yes Yes 
6 Milwaukee Elec. 
Tool Corp. v. 
Snap-On Inc., 
288 F. Supp. 3d 
872, 887, 905 
(E.D. Wis. 2017). 
E.D. Wis. Yes No 
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7 Imperium IP 
Holdings (Cay-
man), Ltd. v. 
Samsung Elecs. 
Co., 203 F. Supp. 
3d 755, 763 (E.D. 
Tex. 2016), 
amended in part, 
No. 4:14-CV-
00371, 2017 WL 
1716589 (E.D. 
Tex. Apr. 27, 
2017). 
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
8 Presidio Compo-





4377096, at *10, 
*21 (S.D. Cal. 
Aug. 17, 2016), 
aff ’d in part, va-
cated in part, re-
manded, 875 
F.3d 1369 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) . 
S.D. Cal. Yes No 
9 Dorman Prod., 
Inc. v. Paccar, 
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 
3d 663, 680 (E.D. 
Pa. 2016). 
E.D. Pa. No No 
10 Dominion Res. 
Inc. v. Alstom 
Grid, Inc., No. 
15-224, 2016 WL 
5674713, at *10, 
*18 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 3, 2016), va-
cated sub nom. 
Dominion En-
ergy, Inc. v. Al-
stom Grid L.L.C., 
725 F. App’x 980 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). 
E.D. Pa. Yes Yes 
11 Idenix Pharm. 
L.L.C. v. Gilead 
Scis., Inc., 271 F. 
Supp. 3d 694, 
698 (D. Del. 
2017). 
D. Kan. Yes No 
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12 Cobalt Boats, 
L.L.C. v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 296 
F. Supp. 3d 791, 
801 (E.D. Va. 
2017). 
E.D. Va. Yes Yes 
13 Ansell 
Healthcare 
Prods. L.L.C. v. 
Reckitt Benck-
iser L.L.C., No. 
15-cv-915-RGA, 
2018 WL 620968, 
at *8 (D. Del. 
Jan. 30, 2018). 
D. Del. No No 






3469535, at *3 
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 6, 
2017). 
N.D. Ga. No No 
15 Enplas Display 
Device Corp. v. 
Seoul Semicon-
ductor Co., No. 
13-cv-05038 NC, 
2016 WL 
4208236, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 
10, 2016), aff 'd 
in part, vacated 
in part, re-
manded, 909 
F.3d 398 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018). 
N.D. Cal. Yes No 
16 Adrea, L.L.C. v. 
Barnes & Noble, 
Inc., 227 F. Supp. 
3d 303, 312–13 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
S.D.N.Y. No No 
17 Finjan, Inc. v. 
Cisco Sys. Inc., 
No. 17-CV-
00072-BLF, 2017 
WL 2462423, at 
*5 (N.D. Cal. 
June 7, 2017). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
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18 Brigham & 
Women’s Hosp., 
Inc. v. Perrigo 
Co., 251 F. Supp. 
3d 285, 293 (D. 
Mass. 2017). 
D. Mass. Yes No 
19 Imperium IP 
Holdings (Cay-
man), Ltd. v. 
Samsung Elecs. 
Co., No. 4:14-CV-
00371, 2017 WL 
1716788, at *3 
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 
27, 2017). 
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
20 Wis. Alumni Re-
search Found. v. 
Apple, Inc., 261 
F. Supp. 3d 900, 
918 (W.D. Wis. 
2017).  
W.D. Wis. No No 
21 Vehicle IP, 
L.L.C. v. AT & T 
Mobility L.L.C., 
227 F. Supp. 3d 
319, 331 (D. Del. 
2016). 
D. Del. No No 
22 Atmos Nation, 
L.L.C. v. BnB 
Enter., L.L.C., 
No. 16-62083-
CIV, 2017 WL 
5004844, at *3 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 
22, 2017). 
S.D. Fla. No No 
23 Preferential Net-
works IP, L.L.C. 
v. AT&T Inc. Mo-
bility, L.L.C., No. 
2:16-CV-01374-
JRG-RSP, 2017 
WL 3816109, at 
*4 (E.D. Tex. 
July 15, 2017). 
E.D. Tex. No No 
24 Cont’l Circuits 
L.L.C. v. Intel 
Corp., No. CV16-
2026 PHX DGC, 
2017 WL 679116, 
D. Ariz. No No 
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at *11 (D. Ariz. 
Feb. 21, 2017). 




7802996, at *4–5 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 
20, 2016). 
N.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
26 Canon, Inc. v. 
Color Imaging, 
Inc., 292 F. Supp. 
3d 1357, 1369 
(N.D. Ga. 2018). 
N.D. Ga. Yes Yes 
27 PPC Broadband, 
Inc. v. Corning 
Optical 
Commc’ns RF, 
L.L.C., 193 F. 
Supp. 3d 133, 
148–50 
(N.D.N.Y. 2016). 
N.D.N.Y. Yes No 
28 Polara Eng’g, 
Inc. v. Campbell 
Co., 237 F. Supp. 
3d 956, 980, 984 
(C.D. Cal. 2017). 
C.D. Cal. Yes Yes 
29 Green Mountain 
Glass L.L.C. v. 
Saint-Gobain 
Containers, Inc., 
300 F. Supp. 3d 
610, 622, 630 (D. 
Del. 2018). 




Inc., No. 11-820 
(JRT/HB), 2018 
WL 3621206, at 
*16 (D. Minn. 
July 30, 2018). 
D. Minn. Yes No 
31 Chamberlain 
Grp., Inc. v. 
Techtronic Indus. 
Co., 315 F. Supp. 
3d 977, 1002, 
1015 (N.D. Ill. 
2018). 
N.D. Ill. Yes Yes 
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32 Nanosys, Inc. v. 
QD Vision, Inc., 
No. 16-CV-
01957-YGR, 2016 
WL 4943006, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 16, 2016). 
N.D. Cal. No No 





4427490, at *5, 
*8 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 22, 2016). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
34 Software Re-
search, Inc. v. 
Dynatrace 
L.L.C., 316 F. 
Supp. 3d 1112, 
1137 (N.D. Cal. 
2018). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
35 Microsoft Corp. 
v. Corel Corp., 
No. 5:15-CV-
05836-EJD, 2018 
WL 2183268, at 
*8 (N.D. Cal. 
May 11, 2018). 
N.D. Cal. Yes Yes 
36 Fitness Any-





6069511, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 
20, 2018). 
N.D. Cal. Yes Yes 
37 NetFuel, Inc. v. 
Cisco Sys. Inc., 
No. 5:18-CV-
02352-EJD, 2018 
WL 4510737, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 18, 2018). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
38 Crane Sec. 
Techs., Inc. v. 
Rolling Optics 
AB, 337 F. Supp. 
D. Mass. Yes Yes 
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3d 48, 60 (D. 
Mass. 2018). 
39 Olaf Soot Design, 
L.L.C. v. 
Daktronics, Inc., 
325 F. Supp. 3d 
456, 464 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
S.D.N.Y. No No 
40 Whirlpool Corp. 




1536874, at *10 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 
29, 2018).  
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
41 Eko Brands, 
L.L.C. v. Adrian 
Rivera Maynez 
Enters., Inc., 325 






42 Exmark Mfg. Co. 
Inc. v. Briggs & 
Stratton Corp., 
348 F. Supp. 3d 
907, 920 (D. Neb. 
2018). 
D. Neb. Yes No 
43 Novartis Vac-
cines & Diagnos-





5282887, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
24, 2018). 
S.D.N.Y. No No 
44 Evonik Degussa 
GmbH v. 
Materia, Inc., 
305 F. Supp. 3d 
563, 580 (D. Del. 
2018). 
D. Del. Yes No 
45 Princeton Dig. 
Image Corp. v. 
Ubisoft Entm’t 
SA, No. CV 13-
335-LPS-CJB, 
D. Del. No No 
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2016 WL 
6594076, at *12 
(D. Del. Nov. 4, 
2016).  




Wis. Aug. 10, 
2016). 
E.D. Wis. Yes No 





3957310 (D. Del. 
May 7, 2018). 
D. Del. Yes Yes 
48 Sprint Commc’ns 




WL 978107, at 
*14 (D. Kan. 
Mar. 14, 2017). 
D. Kan. Yes No 
49 West’s Jury Ver-
dicts – Del. Re-
ports, Sonos Inc. 
v. D&M Holdings 
Inc., No. 14-cv-
1330, 2017 WL 
7797066 (D. Del. 
Dec. 15, 2017). 
D. Del. Yes No 
50 Cobalt Boats, 
L.L.C. v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 296 
F. Supp. 3d 791, 
804–05 (E.D. Va. 
2017). 
E.D. Va. Yes Yes 
51 Verdict & Settle-
ment Summary, 
Loggerhead 
Tools, L.L.C. v. 
Sears Holding 
Corp., No. 12-cv-
9033, 2017 WL 
5989919 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 9, 2017). 
N.D. Ill. Yes No 
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52 SiOnyx, L.L.C. v. 
Hamamatsu Pho-
tonics K.K., 330 
F. Supp. 3d 574, 
613 (D. Mass. 
2018). 
D. Mass. No No 
53 Johnstech Int’l 
Corp. v. JF Tech. 
SDN BHD, No. 
14-cv-02864, 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 
27, 2016). 
N.D. Cal. Yes No 
54 Adidas Am., Inc. 
v. Skechers USA, 
Inc., No. 3:16-cv-
1400-SI, 2017 
WL 2543811, at 
*1 (D. Or. June 
12, 2017). 
D. Or. No No 
55 Stryker Corp. v. 
Zimmer, Inc., No. 
1:10-CV-1223, 
2017 WL 
4286412, at *7 
(W.D. Mich. July 
12, 2017), aff 'd, 
745 F. App’x 167 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). 
W.D. Mich. Yes Yes 
56 Solutran, Inc. v. 
U.S. Bancorp, 
No. 13-cv-02637, 
2019 WL 405513, 
at *34–37 (D. 
Minn. Jan. 18, 
2019). 
D. Minn. No No 
57 Columbia Sports-





WL 1805101, at 
*1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 
17, 2018). 
S.D. Cal. Yes No 
58 Halo Elecs., Inc. 
v. Pulse Elecs., 
Inc., 281 F. Supp. 
3d 1087, 1090, 
1095 (D. Nev. 
2017). 
D. Nev. Yes No 
  
2672 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2617 
 
59 CG Tech. Dev., 
L.L.C. v. Zynga, 
Inc., No. 2:16-cv-
00859, 2017 WL 
662489, at *5 (D. 
Nev. Feb. 17, 
2017). 
D. Nev. No No 
60 Valinge Innova-




CJB, 2018 WL 
2411218, at *11 
(D. Del. May 29, 
2018). 
D. Del. No No 
61 T-Rex Prop. AB 
v. Regal Entm’t 
Grp., No. 6:16-
CV-1029-RWS-
KNM, 2017 WL 
4229372 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 31, 
2017). 
E.D. Tex. No No 
62 Eidos Display, 




WL 1156284, at 
*5–6 (E.D. Tex. 
Mar. 5, 2018). 
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
63 Document Sec. 
Sys., Inc. v. Lite-
On, Inc., No. CV 
17-06050, 2018 
WL 2422589, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 
5, 2018). 
C.D. Cal. No No 
64 M & C Innova-




WL 4620713, at 
*4–6 (S.D. Tex. 
July 31, 2018). 
S.D. Tex. No No 
65 Ericsson Inc. v. 
TCL Commc'n 
Tech. Holdings, 
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 
  




WL 2149736, at 
*10, *12 (E.D. 




Inc. v. Impact 




Cal. May 16, 
2018). 
S.D. Cal. No No 
67 BlackBerry Ltd. 
v. Nokia Corp., 
No. 17-cv-155-
RGA, 2018 WL 
1401330 (D. Del. 
Mar. 20, 2018). 
D. Del. No No 
68 VirnetX Inc. v. 
Apple Inc., 324 F. 
Supp. 3d 836, 
870 (E.D. Tex. 
2017). 
E.D. Tex. Yes Yes 





Inc., No. cv 16-
187-LPS, 2018 
WL 2316637, at 
*11 (D. Del. May 
22, 2018). 
D. Del. No No 
70 Cobalt Boats, 
L.L.C. v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 296 
F. Supp. 3d 791, 
804 (E.D. Va. 
2017). 





312 F. Supp. 3d 
830, 842 (C.D. 
Cal. 2018). 
C.D. Cal. No No 
  
2674 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:2617 
 
72 EMC Corp. v. 
Zerto, Inc., No. cv 
12-956 (GMS), 
2017 WL 
3434212, at *5 
(D. Del. Aug. 10, 
2017). 
D. Del. No No 
73 SRI Int'l, Inc. v. 
Cisco Sys., Inc., 
254 F. Supp. 3d 
680, 723–24 (D. 
Del. 2017). 
D. Del. Yes Yes 
74 Finjan, Inc. v. 
Juniper Net-
works, Inc., No. 
C 17-05659 
WHA, 2018 WL 
905909, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 
14, 2018). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
75 Sleep No. Corp. 
v. Sizewise Rent-
als, L.L.C., No. 
ED cv 18-00356-
AB, 2018 WL 
5263065, at *7 
(C.D. Cal. June 
26, 2018). 
C.D. Cal. No No 




WL 2311407, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. 
May 26, 2017). 
N.D. Cal. No No 
77 Power Integra-





2017 WL 130236, 
at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 13, 2017). 
N.D. Cal. Yes No 
78 Scripps Research 
Inst. v. Illumina, 
Inc., No. 16-cv-
661 JLS (BGS), 
2016 WL 
6834024, at *7 
S.D. Cal. No No 
  
2019] HALO FROM THE OTHER SIDE 2675 
 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 
21, 2016). 
79 Finjan, Inc. v. 
Blue Coat Sys., 
Inc., No. 13-cv-
03999-BLF, 2016 
WL 3880774, at 
*7 (N.D. Cal. 
July 18, 2016).  
N.D. Cal. No No 
 
